Journal of the National Association of
Administrative Law Judiciary
Volume 33

Issue 2

Article 7

10-15-2013

Christopher v. Smithkline Beecham Corporation: A Tough Pill to
Swallow for Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives?
Hsuan Li

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Food and Drug Law Commons, and the Labor and
Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Hsuan Li, Christopher v. Smithkline Beecham Corporation: A Tough Pill to Swallow for Pharmaceutical
Sales Representatives?, 33 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L. Judiciary Iss. 2 (2013)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj/vol33/iss2/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary by an
authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corporation: A
Tough Pill to Swallow for Pharmaceutical Sales
Representatives?
By Hsuan Li*

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 769
II. BACKGROUND ........................................................................... 772
A. Pre-FLSA: The Undefined “White-Collar” Exemption ....... 772
B. FLSA’s “Outside Employee Exemption”.............................. 775
C. Do Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives Actually Make
“Sales?” ............................................................................... 778
III. FACTS ....................................................................................... 783
IV. ANALYSIS OF OPINION .............................................................. 785
A. Justice Alito’s Majority Opinion .......................................... 785
1. Did Auer Deference Apply?.............................................. 787
2. The Court’s Interpretation of “Sales” ............................... 790
B. Justice Breyer’s Dissent ....................................................... 792
V. IMPACT...................................................................................... 793
A. California.............................................................................. 796
B. New Jersey ............................................................................ 797
C. New York............................................................................... 800
D. Massachusetts ....................................................................... 800
E. Texas and Florida................................................................. 801
F. Illinois ................................................................................... 801
G. Pennsylvania......................................................................... 802
VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 805

Fall 2013

A Tough Pill to Swallow

I.

769

INTRODUCTION

Legal observers predict that in President Obama’s second
term, the Department of Labor (DOL) will tackle more cases
concerning employee misclassification and overtime errors.1 What
are the practical effects of such rulings on long-established
employment practices? This note attempts to examine this question
in a particular area of employment law, namely the defining of
exemptions under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA).
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,2 decided by the Supreme
Court in the 2011–2012 session, settled a simple question that
divided the Second and Ninth Circuits and vexed those in the
pharmaceutical industry.3 Should companies like GlaxoSmithKline
*Hsuan Li is a 3L at Pepperdine University School of Law. Her interests
in law include employment law, corporate law, and civil rights.
1

See Jonathan R. Nadler & Joel S. Barras, If Obama Wins, Corporate
America Should Brace for Crackdown on Use of Independent Contractors, FORBES
(Oct. 2, 2012, 2:29 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2012/10/02/ifobama-wins-corporate-america-should-brace-for-crackdown-on-use-ofindependent-contractors (“[T]he [DOL] has made clear that it intends to effect
sweeping changes. Chief among them is a novel provision that could require
companies to prepare a written ‘classification analysis’ for every worker . . . .
[T]his requirement also could apply to employees who fall under one of the
FLSA’s many exemptions covering categories such as professional, administrative,
commissioned sales employees, and others.”); Pat Didomenico, Obama’s Second
Term: What Does It Mean for Employers and HR?, The HR Soapbox, BUS. MGMT.
DAILY
(Nov.
15,
2012,
4:50
PM),
http://www.businessmanagementdaily.com/33846/obamas-second-term-what-doesit-mean-for-employers-and-hr; DeWayne Pope, Obama’s Second Term: What Does
It Mean for Employers and the Workplace? BIRMINGHAM BUS. L. BLOG (Nov. 8,
2012),
http://redmountainlawblog.com/2012/11/08/obamas-second-term-whatdoes-it-mean-for-employers-and-the-workplace.
In fact, the DOL’s Office of the Solicitor is encouraging plaintiffs to file
“white collar” exemption cases through implementation of its Overtime Security
Amicus Program. See Overtime Security Amicus Program, DEP’T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/sol/541amicus.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
2
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
3
A simple misclassification ruling may have significant consequences for
industries. For instance, in this misclassification of employees as independent
contractors, employers may have to pay billions of dollars more in payroll taxes,
Social Security and Medicare taxes, and workers’ compensation taxes each year.
Nadler & Barras, supra note 1. Similarly, a reclassification of PSRs as nonexempt
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Beecham (Glaxo) pay their pharmaceutical sales representatives
(PSRs) overtime compensation under the mandate of FLSA, or are
these PSRs excluded from protection under the “outside salesman”
exemption? The Court held 5–4 that PSRs are considered outside
salesmen exempt from FLSA overtime rules, and the DOL’s most
recent interpretation of the relevant statute was not entitled to
controlling deference.4 This ruling may be a tough pill to swallow
for pharmaceutical sales representatives across the nation, as
Christopher affirmed that they could not use FLSA to claim their
overtime wages.
Or it may not be. After all, PSRs were never compensated for
overtime in the past. The ruling merely validates and preserves that
long-standing employment practice within the pharmaceutical sector.
But a closer look at the ruling reveals greater implications that go
beyond the prescription drug industry. The massive quantitative
effect that the decision has made upon the rights and interests of
those in the pharmaceutical industry may spill into a wide range of
industries and affect many types of employees, including mortgage
loan officers.5 It is clear that the impact of this law is significant and
worth careful consideration because of its widespread impact on not
only the estimated 92,000 PSRs nationwide, but also the tens of
thousands of employees from diverse industries who lie within the
scope of or at the periphery of FLSA.
Another key feature of this opinion is that it provides an
informative example of the Court’s position in relationship to
governmental agencies of the executive branch within the realm of
administrative law. At the heart of the decision are the conflicting
from FLSA could cost the industry billions of dollars in revenue to pay these
employees overtime.
4
Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2164–65.
5
Daniel Fisher, Supreme Court Rejects Labor Dept. View on Sales-Rep
(Jun.
18,
2012,
11:24
AM),
Overtime,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2012/06/18/supreme-court-rejects-labordept-view-on-sales-rep-overtime (“[T]oday’s decision should help overturn the
decision of a federal court in Washington D.C. that approved of the Labor Dept.’s
2010 switch in policy toward counting mortgage loan officers as non-exempt. The
ruling could potentially affect 250,000 employees and cost the financial industry
billions of dollars in back pay.”); see also Wong v. HSBC Mortg. Corp. (USA),
No. C-07-2446 MMC, 2009 WL 151014 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2009) (denying motion
for class certification of mortgage loan officers claiming they were not exempt
under both FLSA and the state “outside sales” exemption).
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interpretations of what FLSA’s outside salesman exemption and
relevant regulations cover. On one side, the pharmaceutical
companies sought to exclude PSRs from qualifying for overtime pay
under FLSA by defining their work as “making sales,” and
categorizing them as outside salesmen.6 On the other side, the DOL
and the Obama administration argued that FLSA was designed to
protect workers from exploitation and excessive hours, and thus
PSRs should not qualify for the outside salesman exemption.7 Under
the Court’s authority in the province of administrative law, the Court
gave the ultimate interpretation of the exemption in the context of
PSRs. Parts II and III of this note will explain the case in depth and
show how both sides were able to make these conflicting arguments,
both of which were rooted in administrative law and FLSA history
and practice. Part III will go into particular detail on how this
interesting interaction resulted in a decision that penalized the DOL
for its failure to “police” the long-standing pharmaceutical industry
practice of placing PSRs within the outside salesman exemption,8 and
how it saved the pharmaceutical industry from spending perhaps
additional millions of dollars annually9—plainly demonstrating what
is at stake in the battles between the agencies and the courts in the
administrative law arena.
In Part IV, this note will examine how the Court came to its
decision. The role of the DOL and other executive agencies may be
summarized under two themes: “(1) the agency is charged with the
detail of regulation and (2) the agency is expected to develop

6

See infra Part II.C.
Id.
8
See Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2168.
9
See generally IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 2010),
vacated, IMS Health, Inc. v. Schneider, 131 S. Ct. 3091 (2011), and abrogated by
Sorel v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (“[P]harmaceutical manufacturers
. . . spend billions of dollars a year to have some 90,000 pharmaceutical sales
representatives make weekly or monthly one-on-one visits to prescribers
nationwide”). The global industry is estimated to make total sales of $820 billion
each year. Steven I. Locke, The Fair Labor Standards Act Exemptions and the
Pharmaceuticals Industry: Are Sales Representatives Entitled to Overtime?, 13
BARRY L. REV. 1, 1 (2009). As many as 100,000 pharmaceutical sales
representatives visit physicians nationwide and distribute between $4 billion and
$14 billion dollars in promotional spending. Id.
7
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expertise in a particular area of regulation.” 10 For governmental
agencies such as the DOL, this means they are charged with the
interpretation of the laws passed by Congress and with promulgating
additional rules and regulations where Congress has granted them
authority to do so. 11 This article examines the interpretation
dimension as well as the latter rulemaking aspect and its interplay
with judicial review. Christopher presented a situation where
Congress deferred the interpretation of the relevant laws (FLSA) to
the controlling agency, the DOL. Yet the Court rejected the DOL’s
interpretation of FLSA. In other words, the agency’s reading of its
own regulations was rejected.
Finally, Part V of this note will analyze the impact of the
ruling in view of the existing laws of individual states. Who is
impacted and how widespread is that impact? What is the
significance of the ruling? This note goes deeper to investigate
whether these predictions are likely to be realized in view of the
existing rules in individual states. Have PSRs effectively lost all
hope in obtaining overtime compensation in every state? This is a
question that shows the interesting coexistence of and interplay
between federal and state administrative law. Part V will discuss
particular states, and provide a general idea of how PSRs who wish
to obtain overtime compensation will fare under state law in the
aftermath of Christopher. In Part VI, I will briefly conclude and
offer predictions on where the industry and the PSRs will go from
here.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Pre-FLSA: The Undefined “White-Collar” Exemption

29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) explicitly excludes “any employee
employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional
capacity . . . or in the capacity of outside salesman” from FLSA
10

WILLIAM F. FOX, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 6 (6th

ed. 2012).
11

See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s
Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001) (explaining that pursuant to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), gaps and
ambiguities in statutes are construed as Congress’s “implied delegation of
authority” to agencies).
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protections.12 These are known as the “white-collar” exemptions.13
These FLSA exemptions trace their lineage down from a line of
antecedents that included the pre-Depression wage and hour
legislation that applied only to “laborers, workmen, and
mechanics,” 14 and the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), 15
which saw the first express proposal for an executive, administrative,
and supervisory exemption. 16 While a class line was drawn to
distinguish upper-level workers, it was unclear which jobs were
12
13

29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2012).
Yuen v. U.S. Asia Commercial Dev. Corp., 974 F. Supp. 515, 519 (E.D.

Va. 1997).
14

Deborah C. Malamud, Engineering the Middle Classes: Class LineDrawing in New Deal Hours Legislation, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2212, 2223 (1998).
Professor Malamud offers many possible reasons for why white-collar workers
were not covered by the pre-New Deal worker protection laws. The main reason
was that the legislation was health-oriented, and white-collar workers did not work
in conditions that were “as injurious to health as those of industrial workers.” Id. at
2223–24. Further, white-collar workers were not unionized, as the unskilled
industrial workers were. Id. at 2224. Finally, Professor Malamud posits that
perhaps the white-collar workers did not welcome these regulations because they
were interested in—and had an opportunity for—professional advancement; not
only did they need the long working hours, they also needed to maintain their
social status, and siding with the bosses rather than the manual workers would be
more in the interest of the white-collar workers. Id.
15
Enacted on June 16, 1933, the purpose of NIRA was “work-spreading,”
because President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration viewed raising wages and
shortening work hours as a means of mitigating the nation’s unemployment
dilemma. Id. at 2253 n.156; see also Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a Minimum Wage, DEP’T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/flsa1938.htm#2 (last visited Feb. 5,
2013) (explaining that while the bill was in Congress, proponents argued that
“unnecessarily long hours . . . wear out part of the working population while they
keep the rest from having work to do.” They were confident that shortening hours
would create millions of new jobs for the unskilled.) Like its successor FLSA,
NIRA provided maximum hours and minimum wage regulations. Unlike FLSA,
however, NIRA did not “specify the permissible wages and hours of labor,” but
only required that all industries form their own codes of fair competition and
comply with the agreed hours and wages regulations. Malamud, supra note 14, at
2253–54. NIRA was found unconstitutional in 1935. See infra note 22.
16
Malamud, supra note 14, at 2236. By the end of the two years that
NIRA was able to guide the formation of worker-friendly industry codes, there was
a “measure of consistency in excluding certain upper-level employees” from
overtime and minimum wage provisions, but there was no articulation or agreement
on where the lines should be drawn between protected and non-protected
employees. Id. at 2281–82.
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considered “white-collar” and which were not. 17 The proper
boundaries of the exemptions were a subject of debate to those in the
industry and even to those within the government administration who
formulated the proposed regulations. 18 Yet the term was never
clearly defined.19 President Roosevelt promised the public that he
would protect the “white-collar class as well as the men in
overalls,” 20 but he never clarified the scope of the classification
either. 21 While NIRA was shot down within two years of its
promulgation—when the Supreme Court of the United States
declared NIRA unconstitutional on “Black Monday,” May 27,
1935 22 —the vaguely-defined white-collar exemption survived and
expanded its exclusions to include the category of outside salesman.23
17
As Professor Malamud points out, sociologists have identified that the
difficulty in distinguishing classes lies in the phenomenon of the “twilight belt in
which some members of the two groups overlap and merge.” Malamud, supra note
14, at 2227. This was true in studies that dichotomized a community into a
“working class” and a “business class.” Id. The distinction has become even
fuzzier with the creation of a “new middle class” that included “[c]ivil servants,
clerks, and clerical workers.” Id. at 2228.
18
The first director of NIRA’s Division of Research and Planning,
Alexander Sachs, expressly exempted executive, administrative, and supervisory
positions from his pre-NIRA memorandum concerning his proposed wage and hour
guidelines for NIRA. Id. at 2236.
19
Sachs’s memorandum did not specify where he drew the class lines, it
“simply [took] the need for an exemption and the location of the boundary line
between regulated and exempt workers for granted.” Id. at 2237. See generally id.
at 2212 (discussing the blurring of class lines and the failure to define the whitecollar class).
20
Id. at 2254; see also Grossman, supra note 15.
21
Alba Edwards, long-term director of the Census Bureau, actually
excluded “manager, officials, and professional persons” from his definition of the
white-collar classification. Malamud, supra note 14, at 2254 (internal quotations
omitted).
22
In Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935),
slaughterhouse operators tested the constitutionality of NIRA by challenging the
“Live Poultry Code” promulgated under section 3 of the Act. Id. at 521. The code
sought to regulate the live poultry industry in and around New York City. Id. at
523. The Court unanimously found that the code resulted from an unconstitutional
“delegation of legislative power.” Id. at 542, 551. This ruling invalidated not only
the live poultry provisions, but also the progressive labor standards of NIRA
completely. Grossman, supra note 15.
Despite the major setback of the Schechter decision, the progressive labor
movement would sweep across the nation again starting on “White Monday,”
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FLSA’s “Outside Employee Exemption”

After President Roosevelt’s reelection in 1936, which he saw
as the public’s support for the New Deal,24 his administration took up
the task of replacing NIRA with a new fair labor standards regulation
that would protect workers from “substandard wages and oppressive
working hours.” 25 After a year-long battle in the House, 26 FLSA
came to fruition on June 24, 1938, and became effective on October
24 of the same year. The new Act required employers to pay
employees at least the federal minimum wage and to compensate
employees one and one-half times their regular wage for hours
worked in excess of forty hours per week.27 However, as was true
for NIRA, Congress did not intend to protect all employees under this
statute. Under § 213(a)(1), the statute exempted white-collar
employees, which include certain executive, administrative,
professional, and outside sales employees. 28 The Roosevelt
administration hoped to alleviate the crisis of widespread
unemployment by implementing this measure. 29 While legislative
history on the exemptions is scarce, the Wage and Hour Division of
the DOL suggests that Congress excluded these classes based on the
premise that these workers earned much higher salaries than blue
collar minimum wage workers and “enjoy[ed] other compensatory
March 29, 1937. Grossman, supra note 15. On this date, the Supreme Court
upheld the Washington minimum wage law in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.
300 U.S. 379 (1937) (the Court ruled in favor of a hotel chambermaid, allowing her
to recover the difference between the state minimum wage and the wages paid to
her). Roosevelt had been reelected by a landslide in 1936, which he understood as
a validation of his New Deal policies, and he pressured the Court into ruling for the
employee by an ultimatum that threatened to diminish the authority of the Court by
adding six justices to the bench. Grossman, supra note 15.
23
See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2012).
24
He won by a landslide, winning by a count of 523 electoral votes to 8.
Grossman, supra note 15.
25
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2162
(2012) (quoting Barrentine v. Arkansas Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739
(1981)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 202(a).
26
For an interesting discussion of Roosevelt’s fair standards campaign in
the halls of Congress, see Grossman, supra note 15.
27
See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a).
28
§ 213(a)(1).
29
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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privileges” and “better opportunities for advancement,” rendering
wage protection unnecessary. 30 Further, these workers enjoyed a
relatively low degree of employer supervision, and the work they
performed was “difficult to standardize to any time frame,” making it
difficult to implement the overtime provisions.31
The outside salesman exemption appeared in the categories of
exclusions and expressly authorized the Secretary of Labor to
promulgate rules “from time to time” and granted it the power to
“define and delimit the specific terms of [the] exemptions through
notice-and-comment rulemaking.” 32 Ultimately, this task was
designated to the DOL’s newly created Wage and Hour Division.33
The Division promulgated specific rules for the outside salesman
exemption in 29 C.F.R. § 541.500, as follows:34
(a) The term “employee employed in the capacity of
outside salesman” in section 13(a)(1) of the Act shall
mean any employee:
(1) Whose primary duty35 is:
30

Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative,
Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122,
22,122–24 (Apr. 24, 2004) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541) [hereinafter Final
Rule].
31
Id. For reasoning that mirrors the Wage and Hour Division’s language,
see Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 398 (9th Cir. 2011),
aff'd, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012) (quoting Jewel Tea Co. v. Williams, 118 F.2d 202,
207–08 (10th Cir. 1941) (“There are no restrictions respecting the time he shall
work and he can earn as much or as little, within the range of his ability, as his
ambition dictates. In lieu of overtime, he ordinarily receives commissions as extra
compensation. He works away from his employer's place of business, is not
subject to the personal supervision of his employer, and his employer has no way
of knowing the number of hours he works per day.”).
32
Final Rule, supra note 30, at 22124; 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).
33
Malamud, supra note 14, at 2289.
34
29 C.F.R. § 541.500 (2013). Although the regulations were reissued in
1938, 1940, 1949, and finally in 2004, the “current regulations are nearly identical
in substance to the regulations issued in the years immediately following the
FLSA’s enactment.” Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2162.
35
“‘Primary duty’ means the principal, main, major, or most important
duty that the employee performs.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a). The Wage and Hour
Division’s 2004 Final Rule reaffirmed its “primary duty” test as the means to
determine whether an employee was to be classified as an outside salesman. Final
Rule, supra note 30, at 22,128. The Final Rule was supported by the Wage and
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(i) making sales within the meaning of section
3(k) of the Act,36 or
(ii) obtaining orders or contracts for services or
for the use of facilities for which a
consideration will be paid by the client or
customer; and
(2) Who is customarily and regularly engaged away
from the employer's place or places of business in
performing such primary duty.
Section 541.500 is the general regulation, while § 541.501(b)
attempts to clarify what
§ 541.500(a)(1)(i) means by “sales within
the meaning of section (k) of the Act.” Unfortunately, the regulation
merely restates the statutory definition of sale, with slight
clarification denoted by the word “include”:
Sales within the meaning of section 3(k) of the Act
include the transfer of title to tangible property, and in
certain cases, of tangible and valuable evidences of
intangible property. Section 3(k) of the Act states that
“sale” or “sell” includes any sale, exchange, contract
to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or
other disposition.37
The final relevant DOL regulation is § 541.503, which defines what
type of “promotion work” is exempt and what is not. This is a
question that is also integral to the issue of whether an employee is
an outside salesman because under the predominant “primary duty”
Hour Division, with the reasoning that the test “is relatively simple, understandable
and eliminates much of the confusion and uncertainty that are present under the
existing rule” (referring to the twenty percent tolerance test, which disqualified a
worker who spent more than twenty percent of his or her work hours on nonexempt
duties, from the exemption). Id. at 22,161. The primary duties test avoided the
difficult problem of keeping track of the work hours of the outside sales employee,
which was consistent with the rationale behind the establishment of the whitecollar exemptions. Id. at 22,128.
36
At the center of the dispute in Christopher was the scope of the word
“sale” as defined by FLSA: “‘Sale’ or ‘sell’ includes any sale, exchange, contract
to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition.” 29 U.S.C. §
203(k); see also Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2162.
37
29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b) (emphasis added).
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test, if one of the employee’s primary duties is nonexempt
promotional work, then he cannot be considered an outside salesman.
On the flip side, if the work is exempt, he must be considered an
outside salesman for FLSA purposes. The text of § 541.503 reads as
follows:
“Promotion work that is actually performed incidental to and
in conjunction with an employee’s own outside sales or
solicitations is exempt work. On the other hand, promotional
work that is incidental to sales made, or to be made, by
someone else is not exempt outside sales work.”38
C.

Do Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives Actually Make
“Sales?”

The PSR is not a salesperson in the traditional sense, but
shares many of the characteristics of a traditional salesperson.
Conventionally known in the pharmaceutical industry as “detail men”
or “detailers,” PSRs provide information to physicians with the goal
of selling pharmaceutical products produced by the drug
manufacturers they represent. 39 Although the law prohibits PSRs
from making actual sales, 40 their job is to induce physicians to
prescribe their products to patients, who will ultimately consummate
the final sale of the products in a pharmacy.41 The success of a PSR

38

Id. § 541.503(a). The regulation goes on to give some examples of what
promotional work may be. For instance, a “company representative . . . visits chain
stores, arranges the merchandise on shelves, replenishes stock by replacing old
with new merchandise, sets up displays and consults with the store manager when
inventory runs low, but does not obtain a commitment for additional purchases.”
Id. § 541.503(c). These duties are “not exempt work unless they are incidental to
and in conjunction with the employee's own outside sales.” Id. Because arranging
merchandise and replenishing stock do not consummate a sale that a person himself
makes, the work cannot be considered exempt as outside sales work. Id.
39
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 387 (9th Cir.
2011).
40
Christopher v. SmithKlein Beecham Corp., No. CV-08-1498-PHXFJM, 2009 WL 4051075, at *3–5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 20, 2009), aff’d sub nom., 635
F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
41
“While it is not possible to directly link a PSR's marketing activities to a
particular patient filling a prescription, the incentive compensation is based, in part,
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undoubtedly depends on their marketing abilities; they undergo
extensive training in sales techniques provided by the drug
manufacturer, and they penetrate clinics and hospitals fully armed
with company sales materials and sample products to distribute to
physicians.42 However, whether the primary duties of a PSR could
actually be defined as “sales” has been disputed by PSRs and their
employers.
If PSRs in fact make sales, then their employers can legally
classify them as exempt outside salesmen who are not entitled to
overtime compensation under FLSA.43 Unfortunately, when drafting
FLSA, Congress did not abide by the schoolhouse rule to refrain
from circular definitions. Instead, the statute defines “sale” as
“include[ing] any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for
sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition.” 44 The Secretary’s
definitions do not bring clarity to this issue either. As the district
court in Christopher pointed out, “The regulations only marginally
expound upon the statutory definition” and do not meaningfully offer
any insight on whether the primary duties of a PSR include “making
sales.”45 Specifically, 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b) provides that sale in §
on the number of prescriptions written by physicians in a PSR's assigned
geographic area.” Id. at *3 (internal citation omitted).
42
Glaxo trains PSRs on different methods to use to complete a call:
When Plaintiffs were hired, they received training in Glaxo's
“Assertive Selling Always Professional (ASAP)” model. They
were also trained to follow Glaxo's “Winning Practices”
program. ASAP and Winning Practices are similarly structured
and emphasize that a PSR should: (1) analyze and understand
what is happening in an assigned region; (2) work with the team
to drive results; (3) master professional knowledge to understand
clinical management of patients; (4) prepare for calls; (5) “Sell
Through Customer–Focused Dialogue”; (6) obtain the strongest
commitment possible from a healthcare professional at the end of
the call; and (7) provide added value to the customer relationship.
Christopher, 635 F.3d at 386–87.
43
Christopher v. SmithKlein Beecham Corp., No. CV-08-1498-PHX-FJM,
2010 WL 396300 at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 1, 2010), aff’d sub nom., 635 F.3d 383 (9th
Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012) (Cases involving these issues and PSRs
“turn[] on the definition of ‘sale’ under FLSA.”).
44
29 U.S.C. § 203(k) (2012).
45
Christopher, 2010 WL 396300, at *1. Additionally, the court added:
“Plaintiffs’ reference to regulations that define ‘promotion work’ and ‘primary
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203(k) “include[s] the transfer of title to tangible property, and in
certain cases, of tangible and valuable evidences of intangible
property.” 46 Pharmaceutical companies argue that courts should
apply a broad meaning of sales and find that the promotional work
that PSRs do to help consummate a future sale constitutes exempt
sales work.47 The DOL and the PSRs, on the other hand, believe the
court should adopt a strict construction that limits sale to an actual
transaction in some sense. 48 In other words, they believe PSRs
should personally receive orders that yield from their promotional
efforts to be considered making sales.
This was the very issue that split the Second and Ninth
Circuits and led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in
Christopher.49 The Second Circuit grappled with the question in In
re Novartis Wage & Hour Litigation.50 In re Novartis was a class
action brought by 2,500 PSRs who were employed by the drug
manufacturer Novartis in California and New York.51 They alleged
that they were entitled to overtime pay under FLSA and state law.52
The DOL filed an amicus brief supporting the plaintiff-PSRs, arguing
that, “the fact that the Reps do not actually ‘make sales’ conclusively
demonstrates that the position is not that of an outside salesperson
consistent with the Department’s legislative rules.”53 The court ruled
duty’ do not serve to define or delimit the definition of ‘sale,’ and therefore do not
advance their position.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
46
29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b) (2013).
47
See Brief for Respondent, Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012) (No. 11-204), 2012 WL 957501 at *27–28.
48
Bryan D. Sullivan, Note, Reconciling the Terms and Spirit of the Law:
Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives and the FLSA Outside-Sales Exemption, 96
IOWA L. REV. 1429, 1437–44 (2011).
49
132 S. Ct. at 2165 (“We grant certiorari to resolve this split.”). A Third
Circuit case, Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 2010), was
ultimately decided on the “administrative employee” exemption rather than the
“outside salesman” exemption. The court found that PSRs were excluded under
the former exemption. Id. at 286.
50
In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010),
abrogated by Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
51
In re Novartis, 611 F.3d at 144.
52
Id.
53
Brief for Sec’y of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of PlaintiffsAppellants, In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010) (No.
09-0437), 2009 WL 3405861.
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that PSRs did not fall within FLSA’s outside salesman exemption
because the requirement should be “narrowly construed against the
employers . . . and their application limited to those establishments
‘plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit.’” 54 The
court referred to two sources: first, 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b), in which
the Secretary of Labor defined § 3(k) of the Act (which defines sales)
to require the “transfer of title”;55 and second, the DOL’s definition
of sale promulgated in the 2004 Final Rule, requiring a sale to at least
include “a commitment to buy.”56 The court reasoned that the type
of “commitment” the PSRs obtain from physicians does not
constitute a commitment to buy or prescribe; the promises they
obtain are too uncertain and remote to satisfy the “transfer of title”
requirement.57
The Ninth Circuit came to the opposite conclusion in
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., the predecessor to the
Supreme Court case in discussion.58 The Secretary of Labor once
again filed an amicus brief in support of the petitioner-PSRs. The
DOL’s brief pointed out that the primary duty of the PSRs is “at most
obtain[ing] from physicians a non-binding commitment to prescribe
GSK drugs to their patients when appropriate,” and argued that the
work should be characterized as nonexempt promotion work. 59
Promotion work can be exempt or nonexempt, according to the
definition stated under 29 C.F.R. § 541.503(a). Using the language
of the statute, the DOL explained that the type of promotional work
that PSRs do “is incidental to sales made, or to be made, by someone
else,” and thus qualifies as nonexempt work under the rules.60 The
54

In re Novartis, 611 F.3d at 150 (emphasis added).
Id. at 151.
56
Id. at 154; see also Final Rule, supra note 30.
57
In re Novartis, 611 F.3d at 154. The court declined to expand the
concept of sales to include what Novartis called promotional activities, remarking
that the pharmaceuticals industry should “direct its efforts to Congress, not the
courts.” Id. at 155.
58
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383 (9th Cir.
2011), aff'd, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
59
Brief for the Sec’y of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of PlaintiffsAppellants, Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383 (9th Cir.
2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012) (No. 15257), 2010 WL 5854250, at *9–10.
60
Id. at *10. The brief also quoted 29 C.F.R. § 541.503(b): “In other
words, ‘Promotion activities directed toward consummation of the employee's own
55
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court held that the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of FLSA’s
definition of sale was not entitled to deference and that the PSRs fell
within scope of the outside salesman exemption to FLSA’s overtime
requirement.61 First, the court wrote that the Secretary’s definition,
forwarded in the amicus brief, failed to clarify sale, but instead
“parroted” the existing statutory language that purported to define
sales. 62 Such an adoption would undermine “the Administrative
Procedures Act and notice-and-comment rulemaking.” 63 Thus, the
court refused to apply Auer deference to the DOL’s definition. 64
Even if Auer applied, the court wrote, “[T]he Secretary’s position is
both plainly erroneous and inconsistent with her own regulations and
practices” and should not be given controlling deference. 65
Determining whether this is a fair statement is as convoluted a
process as the history of the dispute itself. On one hand, the DOL
has resisted—for fifty-five years—to extend the definition of sales to
promotion work that is not done for the purpose of consummating the
employee’s own sales. 66 This was done in spite of pressure from

sales are exempt. Promotional activities designed to stimulate sales that will be
made by someone else are not exempt outside sales work.’” Id.
61
Christopher, 635 F.3d at 392, 401.
62
Id. at 394–95. As in Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006), because
the agency merely “parroted” the statute rather than employing its expertise to
clarify the ambiguous statute, the Court denied the agency Auer deference.
Christopher, 635 F.3d at 395.
63
Christopher, 635 F.3d at 395; see also 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2012)
(expressly giving the Secretary the authority to define and delimit the exemptions
through “notice-and-comment rulemaking”).
64
“Were we to accept the Secretary’s offer, and give controlling deference
even where there exists no meaningful regulatory language to interpret, we would
unduly expand Auer's applicability to interpretations of statutes expressed for the
first time in case-by-case amicus filings.” Christopher, 635 F.3d at 395; see supra
note 105–106 and accompanying text.
65
Id. at 395. It is unclear how the Secretary’s position is “inconsistent
with her own regulations and practices,” for it is noted that for fifty-five years, in
spite of input from commenters such as the United States Chamber of Commerce,
the DOL has refused to extend the definition of sales to promotional work that is
not done for the purpose of consummating the employee’s own sales. See Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3, Christopher v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012) (No. 11-204), 2012 WL
379584 [hereinafter Brief for the United States].
66
See Brief for the United States, supra note 65, at 3.
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commenters such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.67 On the other
hand, the Ninth Circuit in Christopher pointed out that the DOL “did
not challenge the conventional wisdom that detailing is the functional
equivalent of selling pharmaceutical products,” until it spoke on
behalf of the Petitioners in In re Novartis.68 In fact, in the DOL’s
Dictionary of Occupation Titles, the definition for pharmaceutical
detailers reads: “Promotes use of and sells ethical drugs and other
pharmaceutical products to physicians . . . . Promotes and sells other
drugs and medicines manufactured by company. May sell and take
order for pharmaceutical supply items from persons contacted.”69
In sum, the Ninth Circuit thought applying the DOL’s present
interpretation of making sales would create an unjust result for
Glaxo, which had reasonably relied on the seventy-some years of
DOL acquiescence and industry assumption that PSRs were exempt
employees.70 Whether this reasoning would carry the day was to be
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on June 18, 2012.
III.

FACTS

SmithKline Beecham Corporation d/b/a GlaxoSmithKline
(Glaxo) is a pharmaceutical company that develops, markets, and
sells pharmaceutical products worldwide. 71 It follows the industry
practice of dispensing its products to patients through a physician’s
prescription, the only channel available by federal regulations.72
The petitioners were pharmaceutical sales representatives,
Michael Christopher and Frank Buchanan,73 who were employed by

67

Id.
Christopher, 635 F.3d at 399.
69
DEP’T OF LABOR, DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES § 262.157010 (4th ed. 1991).
70
Christopher, 635 F.3d at 400.
71
See
About
Us,
What
We
Do,
GLAXOSMITHKLINE,
http://www.gsk.com/about-us/what-we-do.html (last modified Aug. 6, 2013).
72
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2163
(2012).
73
The petitioners originally sought to bring a class action at the district
court level, but were denied certification by the U.S. District Court for the District
of Arizona. Christopher v. SmithKlein Beecham Corp., No. CV–08–1498–PHX–
FJM, 2009 WL 4051075, at *5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 20, 2009).
68
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Glaxo for approximately four years beginning in 2003.74 Christopher
and Buchanan were primarily “responsible for marketing and
promoting [Glaxo’s] products to physicians” within their assigned
territories, and with encouraging those physicians to prescribe
Glaxo’s products to their patients.75 As was the situation with all the
PSRs under Glaxo’s employment, Christopher and Buchanan were
provided “with detailed reports on physicians, including their
prescribing habits, their market share, and volume of prescriptions
filled.”76 This detailed information was geared towards helping the
PSRs develop a strategic sales plan that focused on targeting “the top
250 physicians in their territory who prescribe for a particular disease
state.” 77 As the majority stated in Christopher, their “primary
objective was to obtain a nonbinding commitment from the physician
to prescribe those drugs in appropriate cases, and the training that
petitioners received underscored the importance of that objective.”78
The petitioners were essentially salesmen, hired for their sales
experience, and trained to close each sales call by obtaining the
maximum commitment possible from the physician.79 They received
more than one month of training from Glaxo, which taught them
about Glaxo products and instructed them on how to sell under the
“Assertive Selling Always Professional (ASAP)” model and
“Winning Practices” program.80 They worked away from the office,
spending about “[forty] hours each week in the field calling on
physicians,” and an additional ten to twenty hours per week
performing miscellaneous tasks, including “attending events,
reviewing product information, and returning phone calls.”81 They
worked with minimal supervision and did not punch a clock or report
their hours.82 On average each year Christopher earned over $72,000
74

Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2164.
Christopher, 2009 WL 4051075 at *1. Glaxo “at one time maintained
as many as 9,000 PSRs to promote their products.” Id.
76
Id. at *2.
77
Id.
78
Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2164.
79
Id. at 2172–73.
80
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 386 (9th Cir.
2011); see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
81
Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2164.
82
Id.
75
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and Buchanan over $76,000, before taxes.83 Both sums accounted
for each employee’s base salary and incentive pay, the latter of which
“was based on the sales volume or market share of their assigned
drugs in their assigned sales territories.” 84 The incentive pay was
uncapped; Christopher’s incentive pay accounted for over thirty
percent of his gross pay annually, and Buchanan’s exceeded twentyfive percent.85
However, neither was paid overtime compensation. 86
Christopher and Buchanan filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Arizona, alleging that Glaxo violated FLSA by failing to
pay them time-and-a-half wages when they worked more than forty
hours per week.87 Glaxo moved for summary judgment based on the
§ 213(a)(1) “outside salesman” exemption and the district court
granted summary judgment to the pharmaceutical company.88
The petitioners appealed the summary judgment and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, agreeing that the
DOL’s interpretation was not entitled to controlling deference and
that the PSRs were exempt employees.89 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari on November 28, 2011.90
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS OF OPINION

Justice Alito’s Majority Opinion

Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, with Justice
Breyer filing a dissenting opinion in which Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Justice Alito began his discussion by
stating that the goal of the Court was to decide whether PSRs fit into
the term “outside salesman” as defined by the DOL. 91 The Court
83

Id.
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 2159.
90
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 760 (mem.),
granting cert. to 635 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2011).
91
Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2161.
84
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introduced FLSA’s outside salesman exemption and explained that
FLSA was passed with the purpose of “protect[ing] all covered
workers from substandard wages and oppressive working hours.”92
Establishing that Congress had not yet defined the term outside
salesman, the Court proceeded to describe the instances of DOL’s
exercise of its power to “defin[e] and delimit[t]” the term.93
The DOL promulgated the regulations in 1938, 1940, 1949,
and in 2004,94 but “[t]he current regulations [were] nearly identical in
substance to the regulations issued in the years immediately
following FLSA’s enactment,” Justice Alito noted. 95 The Court
identified three DOL regulations that were relevant to the
determination of the case,96 but deemed them inconclusive and thus
concluded that additional guidance from the DOL’s Wage and Hour
Division reports made in connection with the 1940, 1949, and 2004
regulation issuances would be helpful to determine the scope of the
exemption.97
Justice Alito then proceeded to provide a factual overview of
the case. He focused on the pharmaceutical company’s position of
having to limit its sales activities to “detailing”—providing
information to physicians about company products to influence the
products they prescribed to their patients in appropriate cases—the
medical practitioners who were ultimately the people “who possess
the authority to prescribe the drugs.”98 He further noted that detailing
had been in practice since “at least the 1950s” and that “the industry
ha[d] employed more than 90,000 detailers nationwide” in recent
years.99 He also underlined the petitioners’ lack of supervision—they
“were not required to punch a clock or report their hours, and they

92
Id. at 2162 (alteration in original). Directly or not, this emphasizes that
outside salesmen are not considered workers suffering from “substandard wages
and oppressive working hours.” Id.
93
Id. (alteration in original).
94
The DOL followed notice-and-comment procedures in its 2004
reissuance. Id.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 2162; see infra Part II.B for a closer look at the three regulations.
97
Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2163.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 2163–64.
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were subject to only minimal supervision”—and described the efforts
of the petitioners as “well compensated.”100
The opinion went on to detail the procedural history of the
case. Justice Alito highlighted certain points that framed the rest of
the Court’s two-part inquiry of (1) whether the DOL’s interpretation
of the regulations relevant to the outside salesman exemption should
be applied, and (2) whether PSRs fit into the outside salesman
exemption as defined by the DOL or the Court, if the latter found the
DOL’s interpretation objectionable within the context of the law.101
The opinion first squarely noted that the DOL’s recent interpretation
of the regulations was “announced in an uninvited amicus brief” filed
in the Second Circuit. 102 Then it summarized a couple of key
concerns that led the Ninth Circuit to find in favor of the respondent
drug manufacturer. First, the DOL had previously interpreted
“making a sale” to require that the salesman “in some sense” sell, but
the DOL had now, without warning, tightened its interpretation in
light of In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litigation, Christopher, and
other similar cases.103 Second, the DOL had for over seventy years
“acquiesced” in the drug industry’s practice of claiming PSRs as
exempt.104
1.

Did Auer Deference Apply?

When courts review agency interpretation of statutes, judges
reach for Auer v. Robbins as an analytical tool.105 Under Auer, if an
100

Id. at 2164.
Id. at 2165, 2170.
102
Id. at 2165. The “uninvited amicus brief” was filed in reaction to In re
Novartis. The argument was rejected and the motion denied by the district court.
See supra notes 48–55 and accompanying text.
103
Final Rule, supra note 30. While the DOL described “a sale” as a
“consummated transaction directly involving the employee for whom the
exemption is sought” in the amicus briefs filed in the Second and Ninth Circuits,
the Secretary now clarifies that a sale requires the employee to transfer title of the
property at issue. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2166 (citing Brief for the United
States, supra note 65, at 12–13).
104
Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2165.
105
519 U.S. 452 (1997). In Auer, police sergeants sued the St. Louis
Board of Police Commissioners under FLSA for overtime wage benefits. Id. at
454. The Court held that the Secretary of Labor reasonably interpreted the “bona
fide executive, administrative, or professional” regulation as denying exempt status
101
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agency interprets its own ambiguous regulation, the court will accord
substantial deference to that agency definition. 106 Even where an
interpretation initially appears in a legal brief, such as where the
DOL’s interpretation of “making a sale” was advanced in its amicus
brief to the Second Circuit, the interpretation may still be entitled to
judicial deference.107 The watchword is may, as courts do not have to
defer to agency interpretations if they are “plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation,” 108 or if the court makes the
judgment that the agency did not fairly consider the matter under
interpretation.109
Diving into the initial question of whether the Court should
defer to the DOL’s interpretation, the Court took the position that the
DOL “changed course” after the Court granted certiorari in
Christopher, 110 and in doing so, “seriously undermine[d] the
principle that agencies should provide regulated parties ‘fair warning
of the conduct [a regulation] prohibits or requires.’” 111 Justice
Alito’s reasoning is perhaps first and foremost outcome-oriented, as
he stated that finding PSRs within the exemption would cause “unfair
surprise” to the pharmaceutical industry, which has treated
detailers/PSRs as outside salesmen for over seventy years.112 There
was no “adequacy of notice” to the companies by way of statutes or
regulations, nor was there ever any enforcement action that signaled
to employees such as police sergeants. Id. at 458. Justice Scalia, on behalf of the
unanimous Court, wrote: “A rule requiring the Secretary to construe his own
regulations narrowly would make little sense, since he is free to write the
regulations as broadly as he wishes, subject only to the limits imposed by the
statute.” Id. at 463.
106
Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2166.
107
Id.
108
Id. (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 461).
109
Id.; see also Stephen M. Johnson, Bringing Deference Back (But for
How Long?): Justice Alito, Chevron, Auer, and Chenery in the Supreme Court's
2006 Term, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (2007), for a discussion of whether Auer has
eroded under recent decisions, especially in the aftermath of Gonzales. Here in
Christopher, the Court again refused to accord judicial deference to agency
interpretations; this could perhaps be viewed as an additional strike by the Roberts
Court against Auer.
110
Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2166.
111
Id. at 2167 (citing Gates & Fox Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm’n, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986)) (alteration in original).
112
Id.
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to the industry that it was misclassifying its 90,000 detailers/PSRs of
recent years and of all others in decades past.113 The opinion stated:
“[W]hile it may be ‘possible for an entire industry to be in violation
of the [FLSA] for a long time without the Labor Department
noticing,’ the ‘more plausible hypothesis’ is that the Department did
not think the industry’s practice was unlawful.”114
Reinforcing the opinion’s legal reasoning in deciding not to
afford Auer deference, Justice Alito stressed—a few years after
Auer—the standard for deference that the Court set out in United
States v. Mead Corp.115: deference to the Department will be given
only to the extent of thoroughness and validity that the agency
demonstrates through its pronouncements.116 If the reasons cited are
not persuasive, then no deference is warranted.117 Here, not only did
the Secretary fail to solicit public comment before advancing the
interpretation, the reasoning that the DOL used to support its
interpretation was not on solid footing.118 In fact, Justice Alito wrote,
the DOL changed its interpretation following the Second Circuit’s
rejection of it.119 Such a decision process was “untenable” and not a
hallmark of the thorough consideration that as required for Auer
deference, as qualified by Mead.120 Perhaps most damaging to the
DOL’s interpretation, wrote Justice Alito, was that the new
interpretation was “flatly inconsistent with the FLSA.”121 That is the
case because the new interpretation required the passing of title in a
sale, but the statute at issue included “consignment for sale” as part

113

Id.
Id. at 2168 (alternation in original) (quoting Yi v. Sterling Collision
Ctrs. Inc., 480 F.3d 505, 510–11 (7th Cir. 2007)).
115
533 U.S. 218 (2001).
116
Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2168–69. Sometimes Mead is cited to
indicate that formal notice-and-comment procedures are a measure of whether an
agency was thorough in its consideration of a given interpretation, but Mead
emphasizes that taking an informal process “does not alone” bar judicial deference.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 219.
117
Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2168–69.
118
Id. at 2169.
119
Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 103.
120
See Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2169.
121
Id.
114
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of the sale definition.” 122 The DOL’s “argu[ment] that a
‘consignment for sale’ may eventually result in the transfer of title”
actually worked against the result that it sought to effect—the
analogy could be extended to the present situation as well—for a
physician’s nonbinding commitment may also eventually result in the
transfer of title.123
The DOL’s readings of regulations that were used to support
its interpretations were deemed defective as well, as the Court
pointed out that the DOL intentionally read the sales regulation under
29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b)124 to necessarily include the transfer of title,
when the regulation did not actually require it.125 Furthermore, the
DOL’s interpretation of promotional work was also forced and not
really relevant or persuasive in determining the meaning of sales,
because the regulation itself does not purport to distinguish between
promotion work and sales, only between exempt and nonexempt
promotion work.126
In its entirety, the opinion finds the DOL’s interpretation
unpersuasive and refuses to apply Auer deference.
2.

The Court’s Interpretation of “Sales”

Because Justice Alito refused to accord Auer deference to the
DOL’s interpretation, he employed the traditional tools of
interpretation and looked to the statute and regulations for clues. The
Court first examined the language of 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1), which
excludes from protection, anyone “employed . . . in the capacity of
[an] outside salesman.” 127 The Court found support for the
proposition that perhaps FLSA’s notion of a salesman was not so
rigid as to exclude anyone who does not fit the standard sense of the
word: “The statute’s emphasis on the ‘capacity’ of the employee
counsels in favor of a functional, rather than a formal, inquiry, one
122

Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 203(k) (2012). “A ‘consignment for sale’
does not involve the transfer of title.” Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2169.
123
Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2169.
124
See 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b) (2013).
125
Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2169.
126
Id. at 2170; see also 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b).
127
Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2170 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1))
(emphasis added).
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that views an employee’s responsibilities in the context of the
particular industry in which the employee works.”128
The DOL’s interpretation also “makes clear that the examples
enumerated in the text are intended to be illustrative, not
exhaustive.” 129 29 C.F.R. § 541.501 clarifies that “sales” are
activities that involve the transfer of title, but it also parrots the
statute in emphasizing that the scope actually “includes any sale,
exchange, . . . or other disposition.”130 Congress’s language (and the
DOL’s reiteration of it) is significant because of the use of “include”
and “any” as modifiers to sale, which means that Congress intended
to include transactions that are not considered sales in a technical
sense.131 If there is any doubt as to this expansive reading, the statute
and regulation even contain a broad catchall phrase of “or other
disposition.” 132 Thus, given the realities of the pharmaceutical
industry, it would be “obscure and [would] defeat the intent and
purpose of Congress” to exclude detailers from this definition.133
Obtaining a nonbinding commitment from a physician
to prescribe one of respondent’s drugs is the most that
petitioners were able to do to ensure the eventual
disposition of the products that respondent sells. This
kind of arrangement, in the unique regulatory
environment within which pharmaceutical companies
must operate, comfortably falls within the catchall
category of “other disposition.”134
With this working definition, the Court applied a “functional”
and comparative analysis to the situation laid out in Christopher and
drew the conclusion that PSRs “bear all of the external indicia of
salesmen.” 135 Not only were Christopher and Buchanan hired for
their sales experience, they were trained to obtain the maximum
128

Id.
Id.
130
29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b) (emphasis added).
131
Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2171.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 2172.
135
Id.
129
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commitment possible from physicians, with the end goal of
“convinc[ing] physicians . . . to prescribe the drug in appropriate
cases.” 136 Moreover, their duties were nearly identical to exempt
employees who, instead of selling over-the-counter drugs, “sell
physician-administered drugs, . . . [which can be] ordered by the
physician directly.”137
Finally, the Court justified its holding as consistent with the
rationale for excluding certain employees from FLSA protections.
Christopher and Buchanan each made more than $70,000 per year on
average, as is common for all detailers in the industry, which would
make them somewhat an anomaly in the category of FLSA-protected
employees, who are typically minimum wage earners.138 Including
them in the nonexempt class would also be contrary to FLSA’s goal
of simplifying compliance with the statute by exempting employees
who perform work that is “difficult to standardize to any time
frame.”139 Indeed, employers could not easily keep track of when
PSRs like Christopher and Buchanan were performing their work in
their respective assigned sales territories, or even how much time it
took for them to accomplish their duties in the field.140
B.

Justice Breyer’s Dissent

Justice Breyer wrote the dissenting opinion. He agreed with
the Court that Auer deference should not be applied. However,
despite using the same method of interpretation as the Court, he
arrived at a different conclusion—namely, that PSRs should not be
treated as exempt employees.141 At the heart of his dissent was the
conviction that detailers do not really sell at all; that the “nonbinding
commitments” that they obtain are not only flimsy assurances,142 but
136

Id. at 2174.
Id. at 2173.
138
See id.; see also Final Rule, supra note 30, at 22,124.
139
Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2173.
140
Id. at 2173; see supra Part III.
141
Christopher, 132 S. Ct at 2179 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
142
What is a “nonbinding commitment” anyways, Justice Breyer asks
rhetorically, and jeeringly juxtaposes the phrase with a series of colloquial
oxymorons—a “definite maybe,” an “impossible solution,” or a “theoretical
experience”—to make his point. Id. at 2176–77. The majority is probably still
more correct in their view that a “nonbinding commitment” is more concrete than
137
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“more naturally characterized as involving ‘promotional activities
designed to stimulate sales made by someone else’”—i.e. nonexempt
promotion work as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 541.503.143 The dissent
reasoned that because both the drug manufacturers and the physicians
acknowledged that physicians do not prescribe the specific drugs
simply because the detailers inform them about it, the “promises”
they obtain cannot be true promises to prescribe and thus can only be
characterized as nonexempt promotion work performed for the
purpose of helping the company obtain an order from the pharmacy
later on.144 The dissent acknowledged that the main characteristics of
a PSR’s job description mirror those occupations that are generally
exempted from FLSA, 145 but nonetheless categorically rejected
keeping PSRs within the exemption for reasons that do not fully
contemplate the key purposes of FLSA and its exemptions,146 which
are to protect non-salary workers and to exempt those who enjoy
greater independence and limited supervision by their employers.147
V.

IMPACT

This section explores how the Christopher ruling may affect
the number of PSR misclassification cases in individual states.
the dissent believes and more comparable to a sale than not. After all, PSRs
calculate their commission earnings based on these commitments; if these promises
to prescribe were not so concrete, would sophisticated pharmaceutical companies
be willing to award their employees for extracting them?
Clearly the work of detailers lies in the gray area between “selling” and
“not selling.” Perhaps like almost everything else in this world, it is a political
question that is colored by each individual’s social and political philosophy and
answered accordingly. That the majority and dissenters are divided along political
lines seem to suggest that this suggestion might be true — i.e., the liberals took a
more employee/PSR-favoring interpretation, and the conservative justices held
steadfastly for the big pharmaceutical employers.
143
Id. at 2177; see also 29 C.F.R. § 541.503 (2013).
144
Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2177–79.
145
The PSRs earn relatively high pay rather than minimum wage, work
uncertain hours and frequently beyond regular work hours, and exercise a high
degree of independence and freedom from supervision. Id. at 2179. These are all
characteristics of the general FLSA exemptions for executive, administrative, and
outside sales employees, and therefore they fall within the statutory provisions. Id.
146
See Id. at 2179–80.
147
See supra text accompanying note 31 (discussing why some types of
workers are exempt under the wage and hour laws).
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Christopher held that PSRs are considered outside sales employees
under FLSA and are thus not protected by FLSA’s overtime
compensation requirements.148 This does not necessarily mean that
state overtime laws that include outside sales employees within its
protections are preempted.149 Nor does this ruling preempt case law
that defines PSRs as nonexempt employees under state overtime
laws.
This leaves the possibility that PSRs may still sue
pharmaceutical manufacturers on this issue based on applicable state
law in states that recognize PSRs as nonexempt employees. On the
other hand, it is likely that most states adopt FLSA’s standards even
for their own state overtime wages. In those states, Christopher is
the final word that precludes further litigation on the subject of
overtime compensation for PSRs. Finally, for states that do not have
overtime requirements or states that have never considered PSRs as
nonexempt to begin with, Christopher has no impact on the number
of overtime cases involving PSRs. Regardless, the effects may
impact the rights and duties of employees in other industries.150

148

Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2156 (majority opinion).
State laws that are stricter than federal law are not preempted by FLSA.
Congress expressly provides in § 218 that the codified provisions of FLSA will not
excuse noncompliance “with any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance” that
establishes a higher minimum wage or lower maximum workweek established by
FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 218 (2012); see also Henry H. Drummonds, Beyond the
Employee Free Choice Act: Unleashing the States in Labor-Management Relations
Policy, 19 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 83, 114 (2009) (“State minimum wage
laws preceded federal legislation by a quarter century” and Congress expressly
provided for “non-preemption of more protective state enactments.”); Final Rule,
supra note 30 at 22123 (“FLSA provides minimum standards that may be
exceeded, but cannot be waived or reduced . . . and the Act does not preclude
employers from entering into collective bargaining agreements providing wages
higher than the statutory minimum, a shorter workweek than the statutory
maximum, or a higher overtime premium.”).
150
For instance, see infra Part IV.A for a discussion of Ramirez v.
Yosemite Water Co., 978 P.2d 2 (Cal. 1999), in which a bottled water route
salesmen sued under the California labor statute for recovery of his overtime
wages.
149
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WHETHER

A PSR CAN BRING SUIT AGAINST A FORMER
PHARMACEUTICAL
EMPLOYER
IN
THE
AFTERMATH
OF
CHRISTOPHER:

^Unless otherwise precluded under the “administrative employee exemption”

Moving beyond a theoretical discussion, this note will now
examine the factual effects of Christopher through the examination
of a handful of states with historically strong labor laws and
protections. Although pharmaceutical companies are chiefly located
in only a handful of states,151 they are open to liability in every state
they send their detailers into. 152 The following is a state-by-state
review of a handful of states with large pharmaceutical manufacturer
presence, to give the reader an idea of whether Christopher directly

151

Out of 1,008 pharmaceutical company headquarters, the states with the
most pharmaceutical companies include California (133), New Jersey (99), New
York (81), Texas (46), Florida (46), Illinois (41), Massachusetts (43), and
Pennsylvania (33). Together, these states account for over half the pharmaceutical
companies registered in the United States. Pharmaceutical Company Directory,
MEDILEXICON, http://www.medilexicon.com/pharmaceuticalcompanies.php (last
visited Feb. 8, 2013).
152
See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Office of Unemp’t Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S.
310, 316, 318 (1945) (“Minimum contacts . . . because of their nature and quality
and the circumstances of their commission, may be deemed sufficient to render the
corporation liable to suit.”).
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impacted the right of PSRs in particular states to obtain overtime
compensation.153
A.

California

California has perhaps the most comprehensive set of labor
and employment laws in the nation as promulgated under the
California Labor Code. 154 The Code provides state overtime
protection,155 but section 1171 of the Code expressly excludes “any
individual employed as an outside salesman.”156 No reported case
has expressly determined whether pharmaceutical salesmen are in
this exempt category.
California’s key “overtime salesman”
classification case is Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., in which the
California Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a bottled
water route salesman was entitled to recover overtime wages under
California law. 157 The California Supreme Court ultimately
remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the
bottled water employee was primarily selling a product or rendering a
service.158 The reasoning in this case is key as guidance for future
cases regarding the classification of “outsides salesmen.” First, the
court made the distinction between California’s standard (as defined
by the State’s Industrial Welfare Commission, or IWC) and the
federal standard (as defined by the Wage and Hour Division of the
DOL).159 The former “takes a purely quantitative approach, focusing
exclusively on whether the individual works more than half the
153

As there is no readily available public data on the number of PSRs
working within particular states, this article will discuss states with greater
pharmaceutical manufacturer presence. The premise is that these are more heavilypopulated states with more medical offices and a greater need for PSRs. Secondly,
because of the companies’ proximity, they probably have greater influence over the
promulgation of labor laws in their respective home states.
154
See OGLETREE DEAKINS, CALIFORNIA WAGE AND HOUR PRACTICE
GROUP,
available
at
http://www.ogletreedeakins.com/sites/default/files/uploads/practiceareas/cawageandhourbrochurecurrent.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
155
CAL. LAB. CODE § 510 (West 2011).
156
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1171.
157
Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., 978 P.2d 2 (Cal. 1999).
158
See id. at 14.
159
See id. at 7–13.
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working time . . . selling . . . or obtaining orders or contracts.”160
FLSA takes a more qualitative approach, requiring the court to
analyze whether the employee’s primary duties are “the making of
sales or the taking of orders.” 161 Second, unlike the federal
regulations, California also does not differentiate between exempt
and nonexempt promotion work. 162 The court noted that, “By
choosing not to track the language of the federal exemption and
instead adopting its own distinct definition of ‘outside salespersons,’
the IWC evidently intended to depart from federal law and to provide,
at least in some cases, greater protection for employees.”163
Overall, pharmaceutical detailers have a fair shot in bringing
suit against employers for recovery of overtime wages in California.
Because California has not yet decided that pharmaceutical salesman
are “outside salesmen” exempt from the protections of the state’s
overtime statute, and because the state supreme court uses the
progressive method of making the determination with a quantitative
approach, it is still possible for pharmaceutical salesmen to challenge
their employers in court, especially if they can show that over fifty
percent of their time is not spent on making sales or taking orders.
True, the PSRs in this state will still run into the difficulty, as the
petitioners in Christopher faced, of convincing the courts that
providing information about pharmaceutical products to physicians is
not the virtual equivalent of “making sales,” but it is an argument that
is still available for California PSRs to make.
B.

New Jersey

The State of New Jersey provides an example of state labor
law moving towards uniformity with FLSA. It has a state overtime
statute that excludes certain classes of employees, including those
employed in an “outside sales capacity.”164 Prior to 2012, the state’s
160

Id. at 10 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Wage Order
No.7-80, which was superseded by CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11070 (1998) but
retains the same definition of “outside salesperson”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
161
Id. at 9 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.505(a) (1998)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
162
Id. at 10.
163
Id. at 11.
164 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 12:56-7.1 (2013).
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approach to determining whether an employee was an “outside sales
person” exempt from the state overtime statute165 was a two-part test
that required the court to go through both a qualitative and
quantitative inquiry to determine whether an employee is considered
an “outside sales person.”166 The qualitative part of the test mirrored
FLSA’s “primary duty” analysis, 167 while the quantitative portion
was an independent basis much like California’s.168 In New Jersey
Department of Labor v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 169 Pepsi-Cola Company
alleged that its employees qualified for the “outside sales persons”
exemption “because they had sales responsibilities, objectives, and
training, and were paid in part on commission.” 170 The court
165

Id.
N.J. Dep’t of Labor v. Pepsi-Cola Co., No. A-918-00T5, 2002 WL
187400, *4–*5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 31, 2002) (quoting N.J. ADMIN.
CODE § 12:56-7.4). The statute stated:
166

(a) “Outside sales person” means any employee:
1. Who is employed for the purpose of and who
is customarily and regularly engaged away from his or her
employer's place or places of business in:
i. Making sales; or
ii. Obtaining orders or contracts for
services or for the use of facilities for which a consideration will
be paid by the client or customer; and
2. Whose hours of work of a nature other than
that described in (a)1 above do not exceed 20 percent of hours
worked in the workweek; provided, that work performed
incidental to and in conjunction with the outside sales person's
own personal sales or solicitations, including incidental deliveries
and collection, shall be regarded as exempt work . . . .
Id.
167

See id.
See supra text accompany note 160.
169
No. A-918-00T5, 2002 WL 187400 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 31,
168

2002).
170

Id. at *5. Naturally, this is the typical argument that employers would
like to make, and neglecting to do so would result in a significant loss of corporate
profit. In Pepsi, New Jersey’s Office of Wage and Hour Compliance determined
that Pepsi-Cola Co. owed its customer representatives and bulk customer
representatives $1,885,098.68 in overtime wages, not to mention a fine of
$188,509.87 in administrative fees relating to the violation. Id. at *2. How many
cans and bottles of Pepsi will the company need to sell to recoup such a loss?
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completed an exhaustive analysis of the duties of the company’s
customer representatives and bulk customer representatives (once
united in a single category as “Route Salesmen”) and determined that:
(1) although it was true that plaintiffs were part of the “Driving
Force” marketing program,171 and (2) commission earned was based
on the territory’s sales growth performance,172 they were not exempt
“outside sales persons.”173 These facts were akin to Christopher and
Buchanan’s participation in the “Winning Practices” program, and
their ability to earn commission based on the performance of their
respective sales territories,174 which meant that PSRs would probably
pass the qualitative part of the test. Thus, if PSRs were able to
persuade the court that they did not spend more than twenty percent
of their work hours engaging in promotional activities that qualify as
“making sales,” they would likely have passed the quantitative part
of New Jersey’s test as well.
However, in 2011, the New Jersey Department of Labor
proposed striking its quantitative limitation on the performance of
non-exempt work to achieve uniformity with FLSA.175 Pursuant to a
notice-and-comment procedure, 176 Section 12:56-7.4 of the New
Jersey Administrative Code was repealed and New Jersey no longer
has a quantitative analysis for defining what encompasses “outside
sales.” It is uncertain whether Pepsi-Cola, Co. will still be helpful to
PSRs seeking overtime compensation as the qualitative portion of the
case analysis has not been impacted by the repeal of § 12:56-7.4.
Nonetheless, the state’s adoption of FLSA’s approach to defining
“outside sales” suggests that New Jersey courts may be compelled to
apply the quantitative analysis more closely to Christopher in the
future.
171

Id. at *6. The program focused on expanding sales through infiltration
of large supermarket chains. Id.
172
Id. at *8.
173
Id. at *1.
174
See supra Part III.
175
Suzanne K. Brown, New Jersey State Department of Labor Proposes
Repeal of Existing Overtime Exemption Rules and Adoption of Federal Overtime
Exemption Regulations, WAGE & HOUR DEFENSE BLOG (Apr. 8, 2011),
http://www.wagehourblog.com/2011/04/articles/state-wage-and-hour-laws/newjersey-state-department-of-labor-proposes-repeal-of-existing-overtime-exemptionrules-and-adoption-of-federal-overtime-exemption-regulations.
176
Id.
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New York

New York has a state overtime statute that expressly excludes
“outside salesmen” from its protection.177 There is no reported case
law that probes the issue of whether a detailer is an “outside
salesman,” nor does the statute contain language that explains what
standard of measurement might be used to determine whether an
employee is an outside salesman.178 PSRs appear to have an open
playing field here.
D.

Massachusetts

Massachusetts’s overtime statute contains a provision that
excludes “any employee [working] . . . as an outside salesman.”179
There is no specific definition given for “outside salesman.”
However, the state’s relevant regulatory code states that the general
exclusions of “bona fide executive, or administrative or professional
person . . . have the same meaning” as FLSA’s terms, and such an
application is supported by case law.180 Although no case law has
discussed whether PSRs are defined as “outside salesmen,”181 given
the inclination of the Massachusetts courts to adopt federal standards
177

See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 652 (McKinney 2010) (minimum and overtime wage
requirements); Id. § 651 (definitions that designate the types of employees that are
not included).
178
Typically, the only time “outside salesmen” are mentioned is in
connection with workers’ compensation cases, in which the court only has to
determine whether the salesperson was within “the course of his employment”
when he was injured. See Post v. Tenn. Prods. & Chem. Corp., 200 N.E.2d 213,
213 (N.Y. 1964) (estate of chemical salesman suing for worker’s compensation);
Freudenfeld v. Louis Stein & Co., 2 N.E.2d 688, 688 (N.Y. 1936) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (estate of fur manufacturer’s outside salesman suing for
worker’s compensation). This does not help with the PSR analysis.
179
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151, § 1A (West) (effective Nov. 26,
2003).
180
455 MASS. CODE REGS. 2.02(3) (2013); see Cash v. Cycle Craft Co.,
482 F. Supp. 2d 133, 140 (D. Mass. 2007), aff'd, 508 F.3d 680 (1st Cir. 2007)
(“The Massachusetts statute governing overtime pay is nearly identical to the
FLSA.”).
181
In fact, no reported case discusses what factors are part of the analysis
to find an employee an “outside employee.”
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for the interpretation of state minimum wage and overtime statutes, it
is likely that the findings in Christopher will apply in this state, even
if Massachusetts’s PSRs bring suit against their employers under
section 1A of chapter 151 of the General Laws of Massachusetts.
E.

Texas and Florida

Because Texas and Florida do not have state overtime
statutes, the only possible option for employees seeking recovery of
overtime wages is FLSA. Christopher establishes the binding
precedent that pharmaceutical salesmen are exempt under FLSA,
thus it is unlikely that such a case will ever be brought before any
court—unless the facts vary significantly (this is unlikely as, overall,
detailers in the industry have been engaging in the same types of
duties for the past seven decades).
F.

Illinois

Illinois’s overtime statute comes with an extensive
description of excluded employees, which includes employees who
serve in a “bona fide executive, administrative or professional
capacity,” as defined by FLSA.182 Notably, “outside salesmen” are
excluded separately from the “white-collar” exemptions, and are
defined as “an employee regularly engaged in making sales or
obtaining orders or contracts for services where a major portion of
such duties are performed away from his employer’s place of
business.” 183 As with the federal law, this is also a qualitative
standard. 184 The state’s appellate court applied such a standard in
DeWig v. Landshire, Inc., a case in which the court was charged with
determining whether a “route salesman”—who delivered his
employer’s “sandwiches and delicatessen foods to convenience
stores, schools and other outlets” in Sandwich, Illinois—was an

182

820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/4 (West 2004).
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/3 (West) (effective Jan. 1, 2009).
184
In fact, even the dissent in DeWig v. Landshire, Inc., 666 N.E.2d 1204,
1208 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (Breslin, J., dissenting) (citation omitted), acknowledged
that “the state definition of outside salesman should be read in a manner consistent
with the federal definition.”
183
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“outside salesman.” 185
As in Christopher, the essential
determination was whether the employee’s employment activities
required him to “regularly engage[] in making sales.”186 The court
rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the Illinois General Assembly’s
intended for a liberal construction of the text, stating that the statute
was clear and “unless otherwise defined, words used in the statute are
to be given their plain, ordinary meaning.”187 For PSRs in Illinois
hoping to be exempt from the statute, DeWig makes it clear that at
least some jurisdictions in Illinois are required to strictly construe the
meaning of “making sales” and are not to consider factors such as
“commission potential or employer control” in applying the
statute.188 There is no further guidance as there are no reported cases
of PSRs suing for overtime compensation.
G.

Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania provides overtime protections for employees
but expressly excludes those who are employed “in the capacity of
outside salesm[e]n.”189 There are no reported cases involving PSRs
suing for overtime compensation. There is one reported case in
which the appellate-level Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania190
demonstrated how the overtime exemptions are applied in the
185

See DeWig, 666 N.E.2d at 1205 (making the mixed factual and legal
finding that the “route salesman” included selling among his primary duties and
thus qualified for the “outside salesman” exemption).
186
Id. at 1206 (internal quotation marks omitted).
187
Id. (citing Granite City Div. of Nat’l Steel Co. v. Ill. Pollution Control
Bd., 613 N.E.2d 719, 733 (Ill. 1993)).
188
Id. This decision was made in Third District of Illinois Appellate
Court. “A decision of the appellate court . . . [is] not binding on other appellate
districts” in the state of Illinois. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Yapejian, 605
N.E.2d 539, 542 (Ill. 1992).
189
43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 333.105(a)(5) (West) (effective Oct. 3,
2012) (the exemptions); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 333.104 (West) (effective July
5, 2012) (the overtime statute).
190
The Commonwealth Court “is unique to Pennsylvania . . . [and] one of
Pennsylvania's two statewide intermediate appellate courts.” Learn, UNIFIED JUD.
SYS. PA., http://www.pacourts.us/learn (last updated Sept. 2013). The court is
differentiated from the state’s appellate-level “superior court,” and is “primarily
responsible for matters involving state and local governments and regulatory
agencies.” Id.
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state, 191 but it offers very little guidance in the way of how PSRs
would fare in Pennsylvania’s courts. Nonetheless, the case serves as
a fine example for comparison between state and federal
administrative law.
In Bayada Nurses, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Industry,
the court laid out the rules of agency interpretation for the state.192
The court stated that “the FLSA does not . . . pre-empt state
regulation of wages and overtime if the state’s standards are more
beneficial to workers.” 193 Moreover, the Minimum Wage Act of
Pennsylvania “grant[ed] the Department [of Labor and Industry]
broad powers” to protect employees, 194 and delegated to
Pennsylvania’s Secretary of Labor the authority to “promulgate
regulations relative to overtime” under section 333.104(c). 195
“When . . . construed liberally, [the statute] confers in the
Department either legislative or interpretative rulemaking power.”196
Finally, the agency’s “interpretation is entitled to great deference and
is to be given controlling weight” unless found “clearly
erroneous.” 197 This mirrors its federal counterpart’s grant of
authority to the Secretary of Labor to enforce and interpret FLSA as
the agency sees fit.
The opinion also examined the differences between “rules
adopted under administrative agencies' legislative rulemaking power
191

See Bayada Nurses, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 958 A.2d 1050 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2008), aff'd, 8 A.3d 866 (Pa. 2010) (upholding the state Secretary of
Labor’s “domestic services” regulation as valid).
192
Id. at 1059.
193
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Manliguez v. Joseph, 226 F. Supp.
2d 377, 388 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Congress
exercised its Commerce Power in legislating FLSA and pursuant to that power,
made FLSA valid in all states. Lisa M. Milani, The Applicability of the Fair Labor
Standards Act to Volunteer Workers at Nonprofit Organizations, 43 WASH. & LEE
L.
REV.
233,
233
n.1
(1986),
available
at
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2849&context=
wlulr. The statute explicitly allows for stricter state laws to survive conflict
preemption as to provide greater protections for employees.
194
Bayada Nurses, Inc., 958 A.2d at 1057.
195
Id. at 1056; 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 333.104(c) (West) (effective
July 5, 2012).
196
Bayada Nurses, Inc., 958 A.2d at 1057.
197
Id. at 1057–58 (citing Riverwalk Casino, L.P. v. Pa. Gaming Control
Bd., 926 A.2d 926 (2007)).
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and their interpretative rulemaking power. The former, known as
substantive rules or regulations, result from legislative power granted
by the legislature . . . .” 198 Substantive rules are presumed to be
reasonable and have the force of law, as long as they are
“reasonable” and constitutional.199 Interpretive rules and regulations
construe statutes and are deferred to as long as they are “reasonable”
and do not expand upon the underlying statute’s terms and
purpose.200 While this does not directly help an analysis of whether
PSRs may or may not be exempt, it is interesting to see how
administrative laws at the state and federal levels mirror one another,
and how each give substantial deference to the respective
administrative agencies that are charged with enforcing the law.
With this knowledge, PSRs (and other exempt employees) are able to
seek greater protections at the state level if they are able to garner
support from the state legislature or the state’s equivalent to the DOL,
which are charged with enforcing and interpreting the statutes.
Thanks to Congress’s express language in the FLSA, they can do this
with the assurance that federal law will not override any expanded
protections.
While placing the spotlight on eight important states in the
pharmaceutical industry provides but a limited sample, the sample
effectively represents the current outlook throughout the United
States, as demonstrated by my research of the overtime statutes in the
fifty states. 201 The research shows that at least fifteen states have
expressly adopted the FLSA’s exemptions as their state law
exemptions or have written provisions that are as exclusive in scope
as the FLSA.202 There are some states that appear to favor employers
more, such as the nineteen or so states that do not have overtime
statutes, which means that, in those states, employees have only the
FLSA or contractual agreements as a recourse for obtaining overtime
wages. 203 There are about nineteen or more states that are like
California, New York, or Pennsylvania, which do have overtime

198

Id. at 1056–57.
Id.
200
Id. at 1057.
201
See infra Appendix.
202
See id.
203
See id.
199
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statutes but also exclude “outside salesmen.”204 In those states, PSRs
will need to fight the same court battles as Christopher and Buchanan
did, with the exception of citing a state statute rather than the FLSA
as their legal authority. This is also true for PSRs working in states
like Alabama and North Carolina, where the state legislatures have
provided overtime statutes but no exclusions.205 It is difficult to say
whether Christopher has impacted the opportunities for success in
the former category of states. As their exemptions are coextensive to,
or adopted from, the FLSA, it is perhaps quite persuasive for
employers to argue that PSRs should be considered exempt under the
state statute because they were found exempt under the federal
standard. On the other hand, judging from the fairly equal divisions
in jurisdictions, it is clear that federal law and policy do not
necessarily dictate what goes on within state legislative and
administrative chambers. In a great number of cases, it will be up to
the courts to decide whether or not Christopher is persuasive in
interpreting state law.
However, there is one category where it is safe to say that the
PSRs—whose territories are located in the nineteen states that never
had overtime statutes to begin with—are negatively impacted by
Christopher. Whereas PSRs in these states could once argue under
the FLSA (as the plaintiff in In re Novartis did successfully), they are
now excluded by the precedent that Christopher has established.
Perhaps PSRs have effectively lost all hope in obtaining overtime
compensation in these states.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This note has discussed how the Supreme Court arrived at its
decision in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. It was a
decision that the Court made through careful consideration of
whether the DOL’s interpretation of a statute the DOL was charged
with enforcing and defining was entitled to deference; whether the
seventy-decade-long practices of the pharmaceutical industry would
be justified by a change in the law; and, finally, whether the FLSA’s
purposes would best be served by its decision. Whether one agrees
with the outcome or not, the law was carried out according to the
204
205

See id.
See id.
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administrative law promulgation and review procedures that the
federal system of checks and balances operate upon.
What is in store for PSRs in the future given the Court’s
decision in Christopher? As this note suggests, many PSRs across
the nation will still have the opportunity to at least argue their cases
under their respective state laws. Perhaps they will succeed based
upon the same reasoning that Christopher, Buchanan, and the DOL
used before the U.S. Supreme Court. Maybe a sympathetic court
analyzing a similar set of facts under state law will reach a different
outcome. Or perhaps the facts of these new plaintiff-PSRs will differ
according to the varying nature of their duties. This is certainly
possible as technology is constantly improving and changing the face
of industry. Perhaps the work of detailers will evolve with
technology and social practices. Would a PSR still be considered an
“outside employee” under the FLSA if he or she telecommunicates
with physicians—from a permanent desk at the pharmaceutical
employer’s office—and sends free samples, gifts, and other
“promotional goods” through the Internet? Probably not. In the
short term, what is more likely to happen is that pharmaceutical
companies will come up with creative ways of changing the work
descriptions for PSRs around the nation, fitting them squarely into
other exemptions or unambiguously within the “outside sales
employee” exemption.
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APPENDIX
State

AL
AK

State
overtime
statute
None
Yes

AZ
AR

Yes
Yes

CA
CO
CT

Yes
Yes
Yes

DE
DC
FL
GA
HI
ID

No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes

IL

Yes

IN
IA
KS

Yes
No
Yes

KY

Yes

LA
ME
MD

No
Yes
Yes

MA
MI
MN
MS

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

State provision exempting "outside salesman"

None
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 23.10.055(9)(B)(3) (West
2013)—coextensive
None
ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-211(D) (West 2007)—
coextensive
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1171 (West 2001)
None
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-58 (West 2013)—
coextensive
None
D.C. CODE § 32-1004 (West 2012)—coextensive
None
None
HAW. CODE R. § 12-21-6 (West 2013)
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-1504(3) (West 2013)—
coextensive
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/3 (West
2009)—coextensive
IND. CODE ANN. § 22-2-2-3 (West 2013)
None
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1202(e)(3) (West
2013)—coextensive
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 337.285 (West 2009)—
coextensive, adopts FLSA
None
None
Coextensive—but must pay overtime if over
sixty hours
Coextensive
None
None
None
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MO
MT
NE
NV

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

OH
OK
OR

Yes
Yes
Yes

PA

Yes

RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes

VA
WA
WV
WI

No
No
Yes
Yes

WY

No

33-2

Coextensive
Coextensive
Coextensive, adopts FLSA
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 608.250 (West 2011)—
outside salespersons whose earnings are based
on commissions
None
Coextensive
None
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 651 (McKinney 2010)
None
N.D. ADMIN. CODE 46-02-07-02 (2013), but
work unrelated to outside sales may not be over
20% of hours
Coextensive
Coextensive, adopts FLSA
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.020 (West 2013)—
coextensive
43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 333.105 (West 2012) —as
defined by the Secretary
None
Coextensive, adopts FLSA
None
None
None
None
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 383 (West 2013)—
outside employee is excluded from “employee”
definition
None
None
None
WIS. ADMIN. CODE DWD § 274.04 (2013)—
outside sales are employees spend 80% time
away from employer
None

